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Financial estimates against investors’
preferences: anchoring, denial and
spillover effects
OZLEM ARIKAN*
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
This experimental study investigates how the characteristics of an estimate in a sensitivity
disclosure and the level of threat it presents to investors’ preferences interact to inﬂuence
investors’ risk judgments. Firstly, I predict and ﬁnd that variation in an estimate affects not
only investors’ judgment on a related issue but also their future judgments on an unrelated
issue. Secondly, I predict and ﬁnd that investors are more sensitive to variations in an
estimate when information contained in the estimate presents less threat to their preferred
conclusions than when it presents greater threat. Finally, I predict and ﬁnd that investors
perceive more uncertainty regarding the association between the disclosed risk factor and
the estimated ﬁnancial reporting item in the estimate when the information presents greater
threat.
Keywords: experiment; sensitivity disclosure; investor judgment; motivated reasoning
1. Introduction
Much previous ﬁnancial accounting research has focused on the decision usefulness of the
accounting information provided (see, for example, Koonce et al. 2005, Elliott et al. 2011,
Nelson and Rupar 2015), with implications for policy, the quality of ﬁnancial information and
the need for investor education programmes. In a similar vein, this study examines how investors
use one of the most prominently disclosed sources of accounting information, namely sensitivity
disclosures. Speciﬁcally, it examines how the format of sensitivity disclosures impacts on inves-
tors’ judgments of the disclosures themselves and of unrelated items.
In a ﬁnancial disclosure setting, a sensitivity disclosure describes the relationship between a
ﬁnancial reporting item and its underlying inputs, typically by indicating how the value of the
item would change in response to a hypothetical percentage change in the underlying input. Sen-
sitivity disclosures are becoming more prevalent with increasing use of fair value ﬁnancial
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Email: o.arikan@aston.ac.uk
*Present address: Aston University, England. Since August 1, 2017.
Paper accepted by Juan Manuel García Lara
Accounting and Business Research, 2018
Vol. 48, No. 3, 299–320, https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2017.1367915
reporting, and managers frequently have discretion to choose the hypothetical changes used in
such disclosures. Accounting standards often allow managers ﬂexibility in the format of their dis-
closures, including sensitivity disclosures, leading to variation in their placement, transparency
and labelling (Koonce and Mercer 2005). Companies typically have ﬂexibility in their choice
of disclosure parameters for the same sensitivity,1 and there is considerable variation across com-
panies’ choice of parameters (Nelson and Rupar 2015).
Psychology theories suggest that format effects may arise even when the format of a disclos-
ure does not convey relevant information, and that certain formats may lead to systematic biases
in investors’ cognitive processing of the information disclosed (Koonce and Mercer 2005). Exam-
ination of hand-picked data from Fortune 100 companies’ sensitivity disclosures reveals that man-
agers do not necessarily convey relevant information in the magnitude of the hypothetical changes
they choose to use in disclosures (see Appendix 1).
I conduct an experiment to examine how, when the actual sensitivity is kept constant (i.e.
each 1% change in the input impacts on the ﬁnancial reporting item by the same amount),
different hypothetical changes in a sensitivity disclosure impact on investors’ beliefs, both
about the ﬁnancial reporting item depicted and about a totally unrelated item, in two settings
in which the information provided poses a low versus high threat to investors’ preferences.
The participants, who are graduate accounting students, play the role of investors. After
viewing some background information about a company, they provide a judgment about its
riskiness. The participants then read a sensitivity disclosure about the relationship between
natural gas prices and the company’s earnings. After reading some information about the
expected company and market returns, the participants make an investment decision on
their given portfolio. Afterwards, they make some judgments relating to the information
given in the sensitivity disclosure, and then answer some demographic questions. At the
end of the experiment, they make a judgment about a matter unrelated to the sensitivity dis-
closure they have previously read.
With random assignment, half the participants receive a sensitivity disclosure using a lower
hypothetical percentage, and the other half receive a sensitivity disclosure using a higher hypothe-
tical percentage, where the actual sensitivity is held constant across conditions. Again with
random assignment, while keeping the risk depicted in the sensitivity disclosure constant, half
the participants read that the company shares are expected to beat the market, and the other
half read that the return on the company shares is expected to be equivalent to the market return.
Since sensitivity disclosures typically inform investors about the risk of change to a ﬁnancial
reporting item, the information depicted in the disclosure often goes against the preferences of
investors who have already invested in the company. Although the previous literature suggests
that individuals anchor on the parameters presented to them (see Tversky and Kahneman
1974, Kennedy et al. 1998), some studies suggest that individuals ignore information that is
not aligned with their preferences (Festinger 1962, Kunda 1999) as long as they are able to
justify themselves (Akerlof and Dickens 1982, Dunning et al. 1995, Kunda 1999), for instance,
by claiming high uncertainty in the input–output relationship in the sensitivity disclosure.
In the experiment, participants are paid according to whether or not the value of their portfolio
beats the market portfolio. Therefore, if, ceteris paribus, the company shares are expected to beat
the market, participants will have a stronger preference for keeping the company shares. Since
sensitivity disclosures typically inform investors about a risk, the information depicted in such
disclosures goes against the preferences of investors who prefer to keep the shares. The higher
the preference, the higher the threat to the preference posed by sensitivity disclosures. Therefore,
in my setting, I operationalize the strength of the extent to which the sensitivity disclosure poses a
threat to investors’ preferences by manipulating the stock’s future expected returns, ceteris
paribus. In the low-threat condition, this return is equal to the market index fund that participants
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can choose as an alternative investment, while in the high-threat condition, it is substantially
higher than the alternative option.
Based on the motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance literature (Festinger 1962, Kunda
1999, Hales 2007), I predict that, when a sensitivity disclosure presents a high threat to investors’
preferences, the magnitude of the hypothetical change has less effect on their risk judgments and
they perceive greater uncertainty regarding the relationship between the input and the output
relationship depicted in the sensitivity disclosure. Drawing on the anchoring literature
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kennedy et al. 1998), I also predict that the magnitude of hypothe-
tical changes in sensitivity disclosures impacts not only on investors’ judgments of the disclosed
risk, but also on those relating to an unrelated matter, such as the likelihood of a change in an asset
that is neither the subject of, nor correlated with, items depicted in the sensitivity disclosure.
The results conﬁrm my predictions. I ﬁnd that a higher hypothetical change in a sensitivity
disclosure increases investors’ risk perceptions, but this effect is only signiﬁcant when the infor-
mation provided poses a low level of threat to investors’ preferences. When the information poses
a high level of threat, participants perceive more uncertainty in the input–output relationship
depicted in the disclosure. Importantly, the magnitude of the hypothetical change in the sensitivity
disclosure also impacts on participants’ judgments of an unrelated issue.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Extant ﬁnancial disclosure research
(Nelson and Rupar 2015) has found that the format of the output of sensitivity disclosures
impacts on investors’ judgments, suggesting that the impact of the format of determinants on
investors’ judgments should also be examined. This paper focuses on the format of one such
determinant, namely the hypothetical change used. Previous ﬁnancial disclosure research has
shown that investors anchor on the parameters presented to them (Kennedy et al. 1998, Nelson
and Rupar 2015), which affects their judgments on issues relating to information in the disclosure.
I extend this ﬁnding by showing that the parameters of a disclosure may also affect investors’
judgments of issues unrelated to the disclosure. Such spill-over effects of anchoring do not
appear to have been examined in previous studies.
Although previous ﬁnancial disclosure research has examined sensitivity disclosures (Koonce
et al. 2005, Elliott et al. 2007b, Nelson and Rupar 2015), it has neither studied the relationship
between the level of threat to investors’ preferences and investors’ reactions to sensitivity disclos-
ures, nor the impact of sensitivity disclosures on investors’ unrelated judgments. Importantly, pre-
vious research on sensitivity disclosures has focused on prospective investors, whereas I focus on
current investors who have already invested in the company. Focusing on current investors is
important because previous research has found that current and prospective investors react to
ﬁnancial information in different ways (Cianci 2008), and that having chosen to hold a particular
stock may exacerbate the inﬂuence of emotions on judgments, which in turn affects behaviour
(Summers and Duxbury 2012). Although my participants did not make the initial decision to
buy shares in the company, they were responsible for making decisions on whether to sell or
keep the company’s shares. Such responsibility may prompt emotions such as anticipated
regret. The participants were told that they would be given feedback on the returns on their port-
folio, which was likely to induce anticipated regret (Zeelenberg 1999).
Previous ﬁnancial disclosure research has also shown that individuals react differently to the
same information depending on their directional preferences (Hales 2007). I complement this
research by providing evidence that, even when directional preferences are the same, in that
the information disclosed is against the directional preference of investors, the level of threat
to these preferences has a differential impact on investors’ judgements.
My study also has practical implications for regulators, managers and investors. It suggests
that investors anchor on the parameters as long as the level of threat posed by such disclosures
to their preferred conclusions is not too high, and that this anchoring spills over to their future,
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unrelated judgments. Managers have ﬂexibility to determine the magnitude of hypothetical
changes used in sensitivity disclosures. Therefore, regulators might consider giving more gui-
dance on this, and managers might consider paying greater attention when setting this magni-
tude. Furthermore, although using high percentages in a sensitivity disclosure may be an
effective strategy for managers in signalling a risk factor to investors, managers should be
aware that this may not always be the case, particularly when a company is otherwise
doing well in terms of future prospects; in such cases, the information contained in the sen-
sitivity disclosure would pose a high threat to investors’ preferences for keeping shares in the
company. Finally, investors who are aware of the effects of the magnitude of hypothetical
changes on their related and unrelated judgments might take steps to eliminate any biases
and thus make better judgments.
Section 2 presents the background to my research questions. In Section 3, I discuss the theory
and develop hypotheses. The methodology is explained in Section 4 and the variables are deﬁned
in Section 5. Section 6 reports the results of the experiment and Section 7 provides concluding
remarks.
2. Background: sensitivity disclosures
A sensitivity disclosure reports how the value of a ﬁnancial reporting item such as earnings, or an
asset or liability, would change according to hypothetical changes in an underlying input. I chose
to examine sensitivity disclosures for two reasons. First, standard setters either require or encou-
rage sensitivity disclosures in many standards, and such disclosures are likely to become more
prevalent as a result of the shift from cost accounting to fair value accounting. For example, Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 requires sensitivity analysis of market risk factors
relating to ﬁnancial instruments (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 2012); Inter-
national Accounting Standard (IAS) 19 requires sensitivity disclosures relating to employee
beneﬁts (IASB 2011); and IAS 36 requires sensitivity analysis relating to impairment of assets
(IASB 2013). Similarly, in the USA, Accounting Standards Codiﬁcation (ASC) 715-20-50
requires sensitivity analysis for retirement beneﬁts (Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) 1990, 2003), and ASC 860-20-50 (FASB 2000) requires sensitivity analysis for securi-
tized ﬁnancial assets. Many companies also voluntarily disclose sensitivity information on
various ﬁnancial statement items, such as inventory obsolescence, foreign currency transactions
and ﬁnancial liabilities.
Second, companies typically have ﬂexibility in their choice of disclosure parameters for the
same sensitivity, and there is considerable variation across companies’ choice of parameters
(Nelson and Rupar 2015; see Appendix 1 for examples). Previous ﬁnancial disclosure literature
on ways in which investors make inferences has concluded that ﬂexibility in disclosure rules
causes investors to make different inferences based on managers’ choices (Botosan 1997,
Fields et al. 2001, Sankar and Subramanyam 2001, Rennekamp 2012). For example, Hirst
et al. (2007) ﬁnd that a disaggregated management earnings forecast increases the credibility
of such contracts, and Koonce et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the labels used by ﬁrms to describe ﬁnancial
instruments and derivatives cause investors to assess economically equivalent instruments as
different in terms of risk.
Even while describing the same sensitivity, companies may use different magnitudes of
hypothetical change. For example, one company may use 1% as the hypothetical change and dis-
close that each 1% increase in the fair value of an asset (input) would decrease the earnings by
$3000 (output). Another company may instead use 20% as the hypothetical change, and disclose
that each 20% increase (decrease) in the fair value of the asset would decrease the earnings by
$60,000.2
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Many hypothetical changes are chosen arbitrarily, rather than reﬂecting companies’ views of
the magnitude of the probable change in the input, even when they suggest otherwise (see Appen-
dix 1). For example, Swift Energy used 5% as a hypothetical increase for both natural gas and oil
prices in its 2013 10K, even though price changes in these commodities had not been similar in
recent years. Furthermore, a broad range of hypothetical changes is used for the same inputs, even
among companies operating in the same industry. For example, in its 2013 10K Freddie Mac used
50 basis points (bp) in describing the relationship between a change in interest rates and the
market value of its net assets and liabilities. On the other hand, Federal Home, a company oper-
ating in the home mortgage business like Freddie Mac, used 200 bp in describing a very similar
relationship, between a change in interest rate and the market value of equity losses in the same
period. Similarly, in the same period, Intel and 3D systems, both in the electronics industry, used
hypothetical changes of 20% and 10%, respectively, in describing the effects of a change in Japa-
nese yen on their revenue and income, while Alaska Air and JetBlue, both in the airline industry,
used hypothetical changes of 1% and 10%, respectively, in the fuel price per gallon in describing
the effect of a change in oil prices on their annual fuel expenses.
While most companies do not disclose whether or not the hypothetical changes used in their
sensitivity disclosures are chosen arbitrarily, there are exceptions. Wells Fargo made the following
disclaimer: ‘The sensitivity analyses provided are hypothetical scenarios and are not considered
probable. They do not represent management’s view of inherent losses in the portfolio as of the
balance sheet date.’ In contrast, Intel provided the following explanation:
a signiﬁcant amount of our operating expenditures and capital purchases is incurred in our exposure to
other currencies, primarily the euro, the Japanese yen, and the Israeli shekel. We considered the his-
torical trends in currency exchange rates and determined that it was reasonably possible that a
weighted average adverse change of 20% in currency exchange rates could be experienced in the
near term.
This explains why the latter used 20% as the hypothetical change in its sensitivity analysis,
suggesting that this magnitude reﬂects beliefs about how much change will occur in the near
term. However, further examination reveals that Intel used exactly the same explanation in its
10Ks between 2003 and 2014, although changes in exchange rates were never near 20% in any
of those years. Furthermore, there were signiﬁcant variations between the exchange rates of the
shekel, yen and euro, even though Intel’s disclosure suggests that the potential expected change
in these currencies was the same. Intel is not alone in using the same hypothetical percentage for
different inputs. For example, in its 2013 10K, 3D used 10% as a hypothetical change for the
euro, Australian dollar, British pound, Swiss franc, Korean won, Japanese yen and Indian rupee.
Managers’ choices in sensitivity disclosures do not yet appear to have been systematically exam-
ined by researchers. Therefore, I hand-collected sensitivity disclosure examples from the 2014
annual ﬁlings (10-K) of Fortune 100 companies (see Appendix 1). The data indeed suggest
that sensitivity disclosures are widely used. Furthermore, different companies use different
hypothetical percentages for the same inputs in the same year (e.g. interest rates); and the same
companies use the same hypothetical changes for very different inputs within the same annual
ﬁling (e.g. Yen, Euro, Shekel).
Overall, such evidence suggests that managers’ choices of hypothetical changes in sensitivity
disclosures may be arbitrary, even when they suggest otherwise. Therefore, investors would do
better not to anchor on these parameters in making their judgments. My study suggests that inves-
tors anchor on the parameters as long as the level of threat posed by such disclosures to their pre-
ferred conclusions is not too high, and that this anchoring spills over to their future, unrelated
judgments.
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3. Theory and hypotheses
Earlier studies in psychology and economics have documented the anchoring effect, whereby
individuals use an initial piece of information to make a subsequent judgment (Tversky and Kah-
neman 1974, McAlvanah and Moul 2013). Previous ﬁnancial disclosure research also suggests
that investors anchor on the parameters presented to them. For example, Nelson and Rupar
(2015) ﬁnd that investors assess higher risk in response to a dollar-formatted disclosure, which
typically has a higher value (e.g. $40 million) than an equivalent percentage-formatted disclosure
with a lower value (e.g. 4%). Elliott et al. (2007b) ﬁnd that investors’ reliability judgments for the
reported ﬁnancial reporting item in a sensitivity disclosure decrease as the hypothetical change
used in the sensitivity disclosure increases.
Consequently, I expect investors to anchor on parameters in the sensitivity disclosure, such as
the magnitude of the hypothetical percentage and the resulting change in the estimated ﬁnancial
reporting item. Without changing the underlying sensitivity, a lower hypothetical percentage will
lead to a smaller change in the estimated ﬁnancial reporting item (output) than a higher hypothe-
tical percentage. If investors are anchoring on the parameters presented to them rather than on the
actual sensitivity, I expect them to perceive the risk to be lower when they are presented with a
lower hypothetical change which would lead to a smaller change in the estimated ﬁnancial report-
ing item. In contrast, I expect them to perceive the risk to be higher when they are presented with a
higher hypothetical change which would lead to a larger change in the estimated ﬁnancial report-
ing item. Consider the previous example which uses a lower hypothetical percentage: ‘every one
per cent increase in the fair value of an asset (input) would have decreased the earnings by
$3,000.’ The increase in the input is small (1%), and its effect on the value of the ﬁnancial report-
ing item is also small ($3000). On the other hand, consider an example which uses a higher
hypothetical change: ‘every 20 per cent increase in the fair value of an asset (input) would
have decreased the earnings by $60,000.’ The increase in the input is large (20%), and its
effect on the value of the ﬁnancial reporting item is also large ($60,000). Therefore, although
investors can easily calculate the underlying sensitivity, they would perceive, in anchoring on
the parameters, the ﬁrst scenario as being less risky than the second, whereas the underlying sen-
sitivity is the same in both scenarios.
Cianci (2008) ﬁnds that current and prospective investors react to ﬁnancial information in
different ways. In particular, she posits that current investors do not want to discover information
that would indicate that their previous information was a mistake. However, both Nelson and
Rupar (2015) and Elliott et al. (2007b) target prospective investors in their settings. Since such
investors have not yet invested in the target company, they have little preference, if any, regarding
the future performance of the company.
Previous ﬁnancial disclosure and psychology literature ﬁnds that investors’ preferences inﬂu-
ence their judgments (Witte 1998, Hales 2007). Therefore, it is important to examine a situation in
which investors have a solid preference for the good performance of a company, as would typi-
cally be the case if they have already invested in the company. A current investor will prefer the
company to perform well. The motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance literature suggests
that individuals process information in a manner that suits their goals (Festinger 1962, Akerlof
and Dickens 1982, Wyer and Frey 1983, Ginossar and Trope 1987, Kunda 1999, Nyborg
2011), which may blind investors to undesirable facts, leading them to make poor choices.
They may even avoid information that suggests bad news for their investment (see, for
example, Karlsson et al. 2009). Previous ﬁnancial disclosure research also ﬁnds that investors’
judgments may be biased by their incentives to achieve a particular condition (Hales 2007).
Hales (2007) ﬁnds that individuals are motivated to agree unthinkingly with information that
aligns with their directional preferences, but to disagree with information that is not so aligned.
304 O. Arikan
In his experiment, investors who were either long or short in a stock reached different judgments
after reading the same information.
Psychology research ﬁnds that individuals tend to ignore information in a disclosure if it poses
a high level of threat to their preferences (Janis 1967, Witte 1998). If an investor is keen to keep
shares in a company because she believes that the shares will bring high returns, she is likely to
ignore bad news about the company in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1962).
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that, having made decisions, people tend to discard infor-
mation which suggests that those decisions may be in error, because they view themselves as
smart, and the cognition that a decision is wrong conﬂicts with that view (Akerlof and Dickens
1982).
Therefore, I expect to see that the level of threat to preferred outcomes perceived by investors
while reading a sensitivity disclosure plays a vital role in how they react to the magnitude of
hypothetical change used in the disclosure. I predict that, when the threat is low, current investors
will continue to anchor on the magnitude, as found in studies by Nelson and Rupar (2015) and
Elliott et al. (2007b) focusing on prospective investors. However, when the threat is high, they
will anchor less because they are more motivated to ignore the disclosure. As a result, I hypoth-
esize the following:
H1a: The magnitude of a hypothetical change used in a sensitivity disclosure has a greater effect on
investors’ perceptions of the disclosed risk when the information presents less threat to their prefer-
ences than when it presents greater threat.
Research on motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance suggests that individuals may draw
conclusions that suit their motivations if they can justify them and construct self-serving theories
for this justiﬁcation (Akerlof and Dickens 1982, Dunning et al. 1995, Kunda 1999). One way to
justify ignoring a disclosed risk factor is to claim some uncertainty in the association between the
disclosed risk factor and its impact on the estimated accounting item or, in other words, to be scep-
tical about the association. I therefore expect to see that when a sensitivity disclosure presents a
greater threat to investors’ preferences, they perceive more uncertainty in how company earnings
would react, for example to a possible movement in natural gas prices, than when the sensitivity
disclosure presents less threat. Thus, my next hypothesis is as follows:
H1b: Investors perceive more uncertainty regarding the association between the estimated item and
the disclosed risk factor when the information in a sensitivity disclosure presents a greater threat to
their preferences than when it presents less threat.
Previous research on knowledge accessibility suggests that, even when information is not relevant
to decision-making, the mere presence of it affects the judgments of individuals (Carlston 1980,
Nisbett et al. 1981, Wyer et al. 1984, Feldman and Lynch 1988). Previous ﬁnancial reporting
research conﬁrms this effect in audit settings (Hackenbrack 1992, Glover 1997, Bhattacharjee
et al. 2007).
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show that an anchoring effect exists even when the infor-
mation is random and irrelevant to a decision. In their experiment, participants observed a
wheel of fortune that stopped on either 10 or 65, and were asked to estimate various quantities,
stated in percentages (for example, the percentage of African countries in the United Nations).
Participants whose wheel stopped on 10 guessed signiﬁcantly lower values (median 25) for the
percentage of African countries in the United Nations than participants whose wheel stopped
at 65 (median 45). This pattern was replicated in other experiments in different contexts. More-
over, pay-offs for accuracy did not reduce this effect. Similarly, in a ﬁnancial reporting context,
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Bhattacharjee et al. (2007) show that auditors’ judgments for one client are inﬂuenced by judg-
ments made for a previous client.
Based on the anchoring literature, I have so far predicted that investors will be anchored on the
parameters given in a sensitivity disclosure when judging the risk identiﬁed in that disclosure.
However, the literature discussed in the preceding paragraph suggests that anchoring is not
limited to judgments that are directly relevant to the anchors, but may also affect judgments on
unrelated issues. Therefore, I expect that the parameters given in a sensitivity disclosure will
affect investors’ judgments on an unrelated item. The previous literature does not appear to
have examined whether anchoring spills over to future judgments where an individual has
already made a judgment in the context of the anchor, yet no empirical evidence has been
found to suggest that the effect of anchoring stops at the ﬁrst judgment. Therefore, I predict
that anchoring spills over to future judgments unrelated to the information given in the context
of the anchors. My ﬁnal hypothesis, therefore, is as follows:
H2: The magnitude of hypothetical changes used in a sensitivity disclosure has an impact on inves-
tors’ future unrelated judgments.
4. Method
I conducted an experiment to answer my research questions in order to establish and test directly
the causal links in which I was interested. For example, I was able to maintain underlying infor-
mation, such as the business description and ﬁnancial reports, while manipulating only the vari-
ables of interest. I manipulated the magnitude of a sensitivity disclosure while keeping the actual
sensitivity constant, and manipulated participants’ level of motivation to ignore the disclosure
while keeping everything else constant.
4.1. Participants
Sixty-one graduate accounting students from a large state university in North America partici-
pated in the experiment as proxies for non-professional investors. On average, the participants
had completed (or were currently enrolled in) 12 accounting and 3 ﬁnance classes. All but one
had previously evaluated a company’s ﬁnancial statements. Twenty-ﬁve per cent of the partici-
pants had previous investment experience and 71% had plans to invest in the future. The appro-
priateness of a particular group of participants depends on whether they have sufﬁcient
knowledge for the task (Libby et al. 2002). Therefore, prior to conducting this study, I determined
that a reasonable understanding of ﬁnancial accounting concepts and basic ﬁnance would be suf-
ﬁcient for participants. I also determined that the task was low in integrative complexity, similar to
those described in Elliott et al. (2007a),3 whose study suggests that, in similar tasks, graduate
business students such as MBAs are good proxies for non-professional investors.
I examined non-professional investors for the following reasons. First, they are an important
investor group, owning nearly 45% of all shares as of 2008 in the USA. In 2015, 56% of US
households owned stocks (McCarthy 2015). Empirical evidence on which information sources
non-professional investors use is scant (Pennington and Kelton 2016). Nevertheless, existing
research suggests that although many non-professional investors use ﬁltered information provided
by professional intermediaries, some use unﬁltered information disclosed by company manage-
ment, such as 10-Ks (Hodge and Pronk 2006, Elliott et al. 2008, Pennington and Kelton
2016). Importantly, ﬁnancial regulators consider such investors in regulating ﬁnancial disclosures
(Elliott et al. 2011, Financial Reporting Council 2017).
Second, the format of sensitivity disclosures is likely to affect non-professional investors more
than professional investors, as previous research shows that the former tend to rely more on the
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management discussion, which is likely to include some sensitivity disclosures, whereas the latter
tend to rely directly on ﬁnancial statements (Hodge and Pronk 2006). Third, compared with pro-
fessional investors, non-professional investors generally have ill-deﬁned valuation models (SRI
International 1987), and are thus more prone to the effect examined in this study.
4.2. Task
The participants were asked to play the role of an investor owning 2500 ACF shares at $4 per
share.4 ACF Inc. is a ﬁctitious company that manufactures agricultural fertilizers. All participants
received excerpts from ACF’s ﬁnancial statements, including a paragraph discussing its business
risks based on an actual company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, stating that natural gas
is an important raw material in ACF’s production and that ACF buys natural gas from North
America, where prices are highly volatile. The document then stated:
Many of ACF Inc.’s competitors beneﬁt from access to lower-priced natural gas through manufactur-
ing facilities in regions with abundant supplies of natural gas. For that reason, ACF Inc. is not able to
pass along the resulting higher operating costs to its customers in the form of higher product prices.
Thus, when natural gas prices go up, ACF Inc.’s earnings go down, and when the prices go down, its
earnings go up.
After reading this background information, participants answered a pre-manipulation question
assessing the seriousness of the risk of an increase in natural gas prices for ACF Inc.5 They
then read a sensitivity disclosure depicting the relationship between earnings and natural gas
prices, at which point the ﬁrst manipulation took place. Based on random assignment, half the
participants read a sensitivity disclosure using a higher hypothetical percentage (‘A 20% increase
(decrease) in natural gas price/gallon would have decreased (increased) earnings by $60 million’),
while the other half read the same disclosure using a lower hypothetical percentage (‘A 1%
increase (decrease) in natural gas price/gallon would have decreased (increased) earnings by
$3 million’). Note that the sensitivity of the estimated item to the risk factor was the same
across both conditions – each 1% change in the risk factor impacted earnings by $3 million –
and participants were able to calculate this sensitivity.
Participants were next asked to decide whether or not to sell some or all their ACF shares. If
they sold any shares, the proceeds would be invested in an S&P 500 Index fund at the same
price as the ACF shares. Participants were given some information about the one-year expected
returns on ACF shares and the S&P Index fund, and were told that they would be paid according
to their portfolio return at the end of one year, which they would learn at the end of the experiment.
Speciﬁcally, they would be paid one dollar if their return was less than or equal to 25%, and ﬁve
dollars otherwise. Based on random assignment, half the participants read that ACF was expected
to earn a return of 35% if there was no change in natural gas prices, which was signiﬁcantly more
than 25%, the trigger rate for earning the reward; whereas the other half read that ACF’s return was
expected to be equal to 25%. This was the second manipulation. All participants were told that the
expected return for the S&P Index fund, the alternative investment, was 25%. The target return of
25% was the return on the participants’ alternative investment option. They were rewarded sub-
stantially more if they could exceed this return. In one condition, participants’ current investment
(ACF Inc. shares) was expected to rise by around the same amount as the alternative investment,
and in the other condition, it was expected to rise substantially more. This design was chosen to
manipulate the extent to which participants were motivated to hold their ACF Inc. shares.
As the participants were notiﬁed about the expected returns on both investment alternatives,
they were likely to experience anticipated regret, which would shape their behaviour (Zeelenberg
1999). They were allowed to sell some or all of their shares and buy shares in the index fund
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instead; therefore, they were responsible for the future returns generated by their portfolio. This
highlights the distinction between current and prospective investors. Previous literature on sensi-
tivity disclosures has focused on prospective investors (Koonce et al. 2005, Elliott et al. 2007b,
Nelson and Rupar 2015) who are not responsible for the returns generated by a company.
However, extant research (Summers and Duxbury 2012) suggests that responsibility for an invest-
ment decision exacerbates the inﬂuence of emotions on judgments, which in turn affects behav-
iour. Therefore, current investors who have made decisions on their investments may not behave
in the same way as prospective investors, who have been the subject of previous studies of sen-
sitivity disclosures.
In this study, the information presented in the sensitivity disclosure posed some threat to all
participants’ preferences, and the strength of this threat was manipulated. This design feature
allowed me to examine the implications of a low versus high threat to investors’ directional
goals for their perceptions of the threat. Recall that the sensitivity disclosure speciﬁed a risk
factor, namely a possible volatility in natural gas prices having an impact on company earnings.
As long as investors preferred to keep the company’s shares, this information presented a threat to
their preferences.
I took the following steps to ensure that, on average, participants would tend to keep rather
than sell the company shares. First, the reward pattern was asymmetric: participants earned sig-
niﬁcantly more ($5 versus $1) when their return was more than 25% than when it was equal to or
less than 25%.6 Second, participants’ only alternative investment, the index fund, was expected to
make 25%, a return insufﬁcient to earn the $5 award. Third, the status quo was owning shares in
the company: participants were told that they owned some shares in the company, and could sell
some or all and buy some index fund shares if they wished. Previous literature suggests that indi-
viduals tend to preserve the status quo (Thaler 1980, Kahneman et al. 2000), which in this case
was to keep their shares in the company. Therefore, even when participants were told that the
company was expected to make a return of 25% (a return insufﬁcient to earn the reward, but
no worse than the alternative),7 they would be more motivated to keep shares in the company
than to sell them.8 According to motivated reasoning theory (Kunda 1999), this in turn would
give them some incentive to ignore the risk factor depicted in the sensitivity disclosure that
suggested that the company might perform worse than at present. However, this incentive
would be much stronger if they were told that, holding the risk factor constant, the company
was expected to earn a return of 35%, which was more than sufﬁcient to earn the reward.
To summarize, the participants would be rewarded signiﬁcantly more when their return was
higher than the market return. Hence, when the shares they held were expected to bring a higher
return than the market return, they would have a much stronger preference to keep the shares, and
would be more likely to overlook the sensitivity disclosure that posed a threat to this preference
and thus less likely to be affected by its parameters. Therefore, I expected that investors would be
more inclined to keep the company shares when the company was expected to beat the market,
and would anchor less on the hypothetical percentages given in the sensitivity disclosure.
After reading the information given to them and making their investment decision, the partici-
pants answered some questions relating to the information given in the sensitivity disclosures.
When they had ﬁnished answering all questions, including demographic questions, they were
told that ACF was in the process of buying an oil-producing company as a subsidiary. They
were also given some information about the relationship between natural gas and oil prices
which suggested that there was not necessarily any relationship between the two. Finally, the par-
ticipants were notiﬁed that oil prices would not affect ACF’s returns for at least two years. This
informed participants that their returns would be unaffected by movements in oil prices, and dis-
entangled the effects of motivated reasoning from the effect of anchoring on parameters for future,
unrelated judgments. The participants read the following excerpt about oil prices:
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ACF Inc. is planning to buy HKO Oil Industries, an oil production company. The purchase is likely to
take place in 2016; therefore, the change in oil prices will begin to affect ACF Inc.’s returns after two
years. A number of academic papers have examined the relationship between natural gas prices and
crude oil prices. There has been no consensus about the relationship: some authors argue that when
crude oil prices increase, natural gas prices also increase; others argue that the relationship is negative
– a decrease in the price of one energy supply is accompanied by a decrease in the price of the other.
Yet other authors posit that natural gas and oil prices have become decoupled from each other in the
last decade.
Having been given this information, the participants answered a question about the likelihood of
oil prices increasing within a year. In asking participants to answer the demographic questions
after they had completed the part about natural gas prices but before starting the section on oil
prices, I aimed to create a distraction task and a delay.
After the participants had answered the question about the likelihood of an oil price increase,
they were notiﬁed about the returns for ACF and the index fund, and were paid according to the
return on their portfolio ($1 or $5). The experiment concluded at this point.
A diagrammatic representation of the experimental timeline is given in Figure 1.
4.3. Manipulations
I manipulated the magnitude of hypothetical changes used in the sensitivity disclosures and the
level of threat to investors’ preferences. The former was manipulated by using different percen-
tages to describe how ACF’s earnings might be inﬂuenced by a change in natural gas prices. Half
the participants, randomly assigned, read a sensitivity disclosure using 1% as the hypothetical
change and the other half read a sensitivity disclosure using 20%, although the underlying sensi-
tivity was the same in both conditions. The sensitivity disclosures in the two conditions read as
follows: for the high-magnitude condition, ‘A 20% increase/decrease in natural gas price per
gallon would have decreased/increased earnings by $60 million’; and for the low-magnitude con-
dition, ‘A 1 per cent increase/decrease in natural gas price per gallon would have decreased/
increased earnings by $3 million.’
My second manipulation was the level of threat to investors’ preferences. As mentioned
above, information presented in the sensitivity disclosure, namely the risk in the volatility of
Figure 1. Experimental timeline.
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natural gas prices, presented some threat to all participants’ preferences. I operationalized the
level of threat to participants’ preferences by manipulating the strength of participants’ prefer-
ences for keeping ACF stocks: the information suggested that ACF would have either an
above-the-market return, or a return equal to the market, holding the natural gas price risk con-
stant. Recall that, according to the payment scheme, participants had an incentive to earn a
return above the market. Their only option to control the risk of an increase in natural gas
prices was to sell ACF Inc. shares; therefore, when ACF Inc. was otherwise expected to beat
the market, the level of threat posed to participants’ preferences by the sensitivity disclosure
was higher. In other words, participants had a stronger incentive to deny the risk communicated
in the sensitivity disclosure.
For the manipulation of this second independent variable, having been told that the S&P 500
Index fund was expected to make a return of 25% ± 3%, participants in the low-threat condition
were told that ACF was expected to make a return of 25% ± 3%, while participants in the high-
threat condition were told that ACF was expected to make a return of 35% ± 3% as long as there
was no signiﬁcant change in natural gas prices.
5. Variables
To control for potential heterogeneity in participants’ ex ante risk assessments of ﬁnancial state-
ment items, after giving them some background information about the relationship between
natural gas prices and the company’s earnings, but before giving them the sensitivity disclosures,
I asked participants to assess the risk of a natural gas price increase by responding to the statement
‘According to the given information, an increase in natural gas prices is a serious risk for ACF
Inc.’, on an 11-point scale from ‘1-Completely disagree’ to ‘11-Completely agree’. This variable
had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the dependent variables of my hypotheses, but neither the indepen-
dent variables nor their interaction had a signiﬁcant effect on them (all p-values > .1, two-tailed,
not tabulated). Therefore, I used this variable as a covariate in all tests unless otherwise indicated.
The ﬁrst independent variable was the magnitude of hypothetical changes used in the sensi-
tivity disclosures and the second was the level of threat to investors’ preferences, both described
above.
The ﬁrst dependent variable was investors’ perceptions of risk as presented in the sensitivity dis-
closure, which is incorporated in H1a. Tomeasure this variable, I asked participants to respond to the
statement ‘According to the given information, an increase in natural gas prices is a serious risk for
ACF Inc.’ on an 11-point scale, ranging from ‘1-Completely disagree’ to ‘11-Completely agree’.
The second dependent variable was investors’ perceptions of uncertainty regarding the associ-
ation between the risk factor and the estimated ﬁnancial reporting item in the sensitivity disclos-
ure, which is incorporated in H1b. To measure this variable, I asked the question ‘How much
uncertainty is involved regarding where the earnings would go in response to a possible move-
ment in natural gas prices?’ on an 11 point scale, ranging from ‘1-No uncertainty’ to ‘11-A lot
of uncertainty’.
The third dependent variable was investors’ perceptions of the likelihood of a rise in oil prices,
which is incorporated in H2. To measure this variable, I asked the question ‘How likely do you
think it is that natural gas prices will rise substantially by the end of one year from now?’ on an 11-
point scale, ranging from ‘1-Very unlikely’ to ‘11-Very likely’.
6. Results
6.1. Manipulation checks
The ﬁrst independent variable was the magnitude of the hypothetical change in the sensitivity dis-
closure. I argue that investors anchor on the parameters presented to them rather than on the actual
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sensitivity, and therefore perceive the risk to be lower when they are presented with a lower
hypothetical change. This leads to a smaller change in the estimated ﬁnancial reporting item
than when they are presented with a higher hypothetical change, even when the underlying sen-
sitivity is the same. The adjusted means and ANCOVA results tabulated in Table 1 conﬁrm that
investors perceived the risk to be signiﬁcantly lower when they were presented with a lower
hypothetical change than a higher hypothetical change (p < .01, one-tailed).
The second independent variable was the extent to which the sensitivity disclosure presented a
threat to investors’ preferences. I operationalized the strength of the threat by manipulating par-
ticipants’ preferences for holding rather than selling ACF Inc. shares. If participants had a stronger
preference for holding the shares, a sensitivity disclosure suggesting a particular risk to the
company should present a greater threat to this preference. An ANOVA, setting the magnitude
of the hypothetical percentage change and the level of threat as independent variables9 and the
number of ACF Inc. shares kept by participants as the dependent variable, conﬁrmed that partici-
pants in the high-threat condition kept signiﬁcantly more ACF Inc. shares (p = .03, one-tailed, not
tabulated; mean = 1469) than participants in the low-threat condition (mean = 1218).10
6.2. Hypotheses tests
H1a predicts that when information contained in a sensitivity disclosure presents less threat to
investors’ preferences, the magnitude of the hypothetical change used in a sensitivity disclosure
Table 1. Risk judgments relating to a rise in natural gas prices.
Hypothetical change
Level of threat to preferences Low (1%) High (20%) Average
Panel A: Risk judgments relating to a rise in natural gas prices – adjusted least squares mean [standard error]
Low 8.556 [0.301] N = 15 9.961 [0.300] N = 15 9.258 [0.211] N = 30
High 9.118 [0.299] N = 15 9.468 [0.290] N = 16 9.293 [0.208] N = 31
Average 8.837 [0.213] N = 30 9.714 [0.209] N = 31
Panel B: ANCOVA model of risk judgments for a rise in natural gas prices
Source of variation SS df MS F-Stat p-Value
Percentage 11.309 1 11.309 8.474 <.01
Level of threat to preferences (Threat) 0.018 1 0.018 0.014 .45
Percentage × Threat 4.224 1 4.224 3.165 .04
Pre-risk Judgment. 89.501 1 89.501 67.063 <.001
Error 74.736 56 1.335
Panel C: Follow-up simple effects tests for Hypothesis 1
Source SS df MS F-Stat p-Value
Low threat 14.357 1 14.357 7.592 <.01
High threat 0.864 1 0.864 1.024 .16
Notes: This table presents the adjusted means, ANCOVA and follow-up simple effects test for the measure used to capture
participants’ risk judgments for a rise in natural gas prices. The ﬁrst independent variable (percentage) is whether the
hypothetical percentage used in the sensitivity disclosure about the change in natural gas prices is low (1%) or high
(20%). The second independent variable (Threat) is whether the information in the sensitivity disclosure poses a
relatively low or high threat to investors’ preferences. The covariate (Pre-risk judgment) captures participants’ risk
judgments before seeing the manipulations but after reading some background information about the company. The
dependent variable captures the same judgments after seeing the sensitivity disclosure. In both instances, participants
answered the following question: ‘According to the given information, an increase in natural gas prices is a serious
risk for ACF Inc.’ using an 11-point scale anchored on 1 (‘Completely disagree’) and 11 (‘Completely agree’). All p-
values are one-tailed given directional predictions.
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has a greater effect on their perceptions of the disclosed risk than when it presents a greater threat.
Recall that cognitive dissonance and motivated reasoning theories predict that when people make
a decision they tend to ignore information (the threat) that suggests that the decision may be
wrong. In my setting, the decision was to keep (or sell) shares in the company. Half the partici-
pants in my experiment were given greater motivation to keep their shares, being advised that if
the risk depicted in the sensitivity did not materialize, the company was expected to make greater
returns so they would earn higher rewards. As expected, these participants kept more shares in the
company (see Section 6.1), and I therefore predicted that these participants would be less
anchored to the parameters in the disclosure, as they would be more inclined to ignore the sen-
sitivity disclosure.
To test this hypothesis, I conducted an ANCOVA using investors’ perceptions of the disclosed
risk as the dependent variable, the level of threat presented to investors’ preferences by the sen-
sitivity disclosure (threat) and the magnitude of hypothetical changes in the sensitivity disclosure
(percentage) as the independent variables, and their risk judgments before reading the sensitivity
disclosure as the covariate (pre-risk perception). The adjusted mean squares are reported in Panel
A and ANCOVA results are reported in Panel B of Table 1. The results reveal that the interaction
of the percentage and incentive variables (p = .04, one-tailed) had a signiﬁcant effect on investors’
risk judgments.
The adjusted means show that, while a higher (lower) hypothetical change increased
(decreased) investors’ risk judgments, it had less effect on investors’ risk judgments when the sen-
sitivity disclosure presented a higher level of threat to participants’ preferences. Follow-up simple
effect tests, reported in Table 1 Panel C, support H1a. When the level of threat is higher, percen-
tage has an insigniﬁcant effect on investors’ risk perceptions (p = .16, one-tailed); however, when
the level of threat is lower, percentage has a signiﬁcant effect on their risk perceptions (p < .01,
one-tailed). Figure 2 describes these results graphically.
H1b predicts that investors perceive more uncertainty regarding the association between the
estimated ﬁnancial reporting item and the disclosed risk factor when the information contained in
a sensitivity disclosure presents a greater threat to their preferences than when it presents less
threat. To test this hypothesis, I conducted an ANCOVA, using investors’ perceptions of the
association between natural gas prices and earnings as the dependent variable, the level of
threat presented to investors’ preferences by the sensitivity disclosure (threat) and the magnitude
of hypothetical changes in the sensitivity disclosure (percentage) as the independent variables,
and their risk judgments before reading the sensitivity disclosure as the covariate (pre-risk percep-
tion). The ANCOVA results reported in Table 2 Panel B, reveal that the level of threat to partici-
pants’ preferences presented by the sensitivity disclosure had a marginally signiﬁcant impact on
their judgments of the association between natural gas prices and their impact on earnings
(p = .07, one-tailed). I measured this variable by asking participants ‘how much uncertainty is
involved regarding where the earnings would go in response to a possible movement in natural
gas prices?’ on an 11-point scale, ranging from ‘1-No uncertainty’ to ‘11-A lot of uncertainty’.
The adjusted means (see Table 2 Panel A) show that when the level of threat to participants’ pre-
ferences presented by the sensitivity disclosure was high, and therefore participants had a stronger
incentive to ignore the sensitivity disclosure, they perceived more uncertainty in the association
between a change in natural gas prices and its impact on earnings than participants who had a
weaker incentive to ignore the sensitivity disclosure.
To test H2, which predicts that investors will also anchor on the magnitude of hypothetical
change given in the sensitive disclosure for future unrelated judgments, I conducted an
ANCOVA, using investors’ judgments of the likelihood of a rise in oil prices as the dependent
variable, the level of threat to investors’ preferences presented by the sensitivity disclosure
(threat) and hypothetical changes in the sensitivity disclosure (percentage) as the independent
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variables, and their risk judgments before reading the sensitivity disclosure as the covariate (pre-
risk perception). The adjusted means, reported in Table 3 Panel A, reveal that the percentage used
in the sensitivity disclosure regarding natural gas prices signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced participants’
judgments of the likelihood of a rise in oil prices (p = .04, one-tailed), conﬁrming my hypothesis.
I measured this variable by asking participants ‘how likely do you think it is that oil prices will
rise substantially by the end of one year from now?’ on an 11-point scale, ranging from ‘1-very
unlikely’ to ‘11-very likely’, after giving them some information which concluded that there was
not necessarily any relationship between natural gas and oil prices.
A follow-up simple effects test conﬁrmed a similar pattern in investors’ judgments of natural
gas and oil prices, as reported in Table 3 Panel C. When the level of threat presented by the sen-
sitivity disclosure was lower, the magnitude of the hypothetical change used in the sensitivity dis-
closure had a signiﬁcant effect on their judgments (p = .035, one-tailed). On the other hand, when
the level of threat to investors’ preferences presented by the sensitivity disclosure was higher,
giving investors a stronger incentive to ignore the depicted risk, the magnitude of the hypothetical
percentage used in the sensitivity disclosure did not have a signiﬁcant impact on their judgments
of oil prices (p = .19, one-tailed). Figure 3 compares the results for participants’ natural gas and oil
price judgments graphically. This is the opposite of the relationship observed in participants’ risk
Figure 2. Risk judgments when level of threat to investors’ preferences presented by sensitivity disclosure
is low versus high (H1a).
Notes: This ﬁgure represents the results for H1a. See Table 1 for the variables used in the test.
Figure 3. Comparison of investors’ judgments relating to increases in natural gas price and oil price.
Notes: This ﬁgure compares the results of the hypotheses H1a and H2. See Table 1 for the description of
variables used in testing H1a and Table 3 for the description of variables used in testing H2.
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judgments measured by the statement ‘According to the given information, an increase in natural
gas prices is a serious risk for ACF Inc.’ These results suggest that investors perceived natural gas
and oil prices to be negatively associated.
An alternative explanation for these results is that participants did not understand the text
explaining that there was not necessarily any relationship between natural gas and oil prices. To
examine this possibility, I analysed participants’ answers to a comprehension question, ‘As you
know, a number of academic papers examined the relationship between natural gas prices and
crude oil prices. What was the consensus reached by those papers about the relationship
between the natural gas prices and crude oil prices?’ This had the following answer choices
given in randomized order: ‘No consensus was reached’/‘That there is a positive relationship
between natural gas prices and crude oil prices’/‘That natural gas prices and crude oil prices
decoupled from each other in the last decade’/‘That there is a negative relationship between
natural gas prices and crude oil prices.’ Forty-one out of 61 participants answered this question cor-
rectly (‘No consensus was reached’). When I limited my analysis to participants who correctly
answered this question, H2 was still supported. The magnitude of the hypothetical percentage
used in the sensitivity disclosure had a signiﬁcant impact on participants’ judgment of oil prices
(p = .02, one-tailed, not tabulated), and participants who viewed the larger percentage judged
the likelihood of an oil price increase as signiﬁcantly lower (adjusted mean = 6.07) than
Table 2. Judgments for the uncertainty of the association between a change in natural gas prices and its
impact on earnings.
Hypothetical change
Threat to preferences Low (1%) High (20%) Average
Panel A: Judgments for the uncertainty of the association between a change in natural gas prices and its
impact on earnings – adjusted least squares mean [standard error]
Low 4.870 [0.592] N = 15 5.954 [0.589] N = 15 5.412 [0.415] N = 30
High 6.424 [0.587] N = 15 6.143 [0.570] N = 16 6.283 [0.408] N = 31
Average 5.647 [0.418] N = 30 6.049 [0.412] N = 31
Panel B: ANCOVA model of judgments for the uncertainty of the association between a change in natural
gas prices and its impact on earnings
Source of variation SS df MS F-Stat p-Value
Percentage 2.373 1 2.373 0.461 0.25
Threat to Preferences (Threat) 11.541 1 11.541 2.241 0.07
Percentage × Threat 7.080 1 7.080 0.461 0.17
Pre-risk Jdgmnt. 11.970 1 11.970 2.324 0.065
Error 288.434 56 3.450
Notes: This table presents the adjusted means and ANCOVA for the measure used to capture participants’ uncertainty
judgments for the association between a change in natural gas prices and its impact on earnings. The ﬁrst independent
variable (percentage) is whether the hypothetical percentage used in the sensitivity disclosure about the change in
natural gas prices is low (1%) or high (20%). The second independent variable (Threat) is whether the information in
the sensitivity disclosure poses a relatively low or high threat to investors’ preferences. The covariate (Pre-risk
judgment) captures participants’ risk judgments before seeing the manipulations but after reading some background
information about the company. This variable is measured by participants’ responses to the question ‘According to the
given information, an increase in natural gas prices is a serious risk for ACF Inc.’ using an 11-point scale anchored on
1 (‘Completely disagree’) and 11 (‘Completely agree’). The dependent variable captures the association between a
change in natural gas prices and company earnings, which was asked after participants had reviewed the sensitivity
disclosure. This variable is measured by participants’ responses to the question ‘How much uncertainty is involved
regarding where the earnings would go in response to a possible movement in natural gas prices?’ using an 11-point
scale anchored on 1 (‘No uncertainty’) and 11 (‘A lot of uncertainty’). All p-values are one-tailed given directional
predictions.
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participants who viewed the smaller percentage (adjusted mean = 7.39). Moreover, participants’
answers to the comprehension question did not have a signiﬁcant impact on the dependent variable
for H2 (p = .645, two-tailed). As an additional robustness check, I omitted participants who said
that there was a negative relationship between natural gas prices and crude oil prices, as the
results suggested that participants perceived natural gas and oil prices to be negatively correlated,
as shown in Figure 3. The results were still signiﬁcant (p = .027, one-tailed). Overall, the robustness
tests suggest that the results were produced by an anchoring effect rather than a misunderstanding
of the text.
7. Conclusion
This study investigated how the format of an estimate in a sensitivity disclosure and the level of
threat presented to investors by the disclosure interact to inﬂuence investors’ judgments, both on
an issue related to the information depicted in the sensitivity disclosure and on an unrelated issue.
First, I found that investors are more sensitive to variations in an estimate when the information
presents less threat than when it presents a greater threat. Second, I found that investors perceive
more uncertainty regarding the association between the disclosed risk factor and the estimated
ﬁnancial reporting item when the information presents a greater threat. Finally, and importantly,
Table 3. Risk judgments for a rise in oil prices.
Hypothetical change
Level of threat to preferences (Threat) Low (1%) High (20%) Average
Panel A: Risk judgments for a rise in oil prices – adjusted least squares mean [standard error]
Low 7.522 [0.485] N = 15 6.185 [0.482] N = 15 6.853 [0.339] N = 30
High 6.707 [0.480] N = 15 6.300 [0.466] N = 16 6.503 [0.334] N = 31
Average 7.114 [0.342] N = 30 6.242 [0.337] N = 31
Panel B: ANCOVA model of risk judgments for a rise in oil prices
Source of variation SS df MS F-Stat p-Value
Percentage 11.168 1 11.168 3.238 0.04
Level of threat to preferences (Threat) 1.861 1 1.861 0.539 0.23
Percentage × Threat 3.284 1 3.284 0.952 0.17
Pre-risk Jdgmnt. 10.440 1 10.440 3.027 0.04
Error 193.176 56 3.450
Panel C: Follow-up simple effects tests for Hypothesis 2
Source SS df MS F-Stat p-Value
Low threat 9.871 1 9.871 3.494 0.035
High threat 2.814 1 2.814 0.774 0.19
This table presents the adjusted means, ANCOVA, and follow-up simple effects test for the measure used to capture
participants’ risk judgments for a rise in oil prices. The ﬁrst independent variable (percentage) is whether the
hypothetical percentage used in the sensitivity disclosure about the change in natural gas prices is low (1%) or high
(20%). The second independent variable (Threat) is whether the information in the sensitivity disclosure poses a
relatively low or high threat to investors’ preferences. The covariate (Pre-risk judgment) captures participants’ risk
judgments before seeing the manipulations but after reading some background information about the company. This
variable is measured by participants’ responses to the question ‘According to the given information, an increase in
natural gas prices is a serious risk for ACF Inc.’ using an 11-point scale anchored on 1 (‘Completely disagree’) and 11
(‘Completely agree’). The dependent variable is measured by participants’ responses to the question ‘How likely do
you think it is that oil prices will substantially rise by the end of one year from now?’ using an 11-point scale
anchored on 1 (‘Very unlikely’) and 11 (‘Very likely’). All p-values are one-tailed given directional predictions.
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I found that the format of the estimate also has a signiﬁcant impact on investors’ judgments on an
unrelated issue, but this effect is only signiﬁcant when the information presents less threat. My
study suggests that current investors anchor on parameters as long as the level of threat posed
by such disclosures to their preferred conclusions is not too high, and that this anchoring spills
over to their future, unrelated judgments.
As with any experimental research, this study has limitations. The experimental materials
used in this study are not entirely representative of what would normally be available when inves-
tors make decisions. Providing participants with that level of detail would require more time to
complete the materials than could realistically be requested. Therefore, this study is subject to
the same caveats as other experimental studies, since a perfect replication of the real world is
impossible in any experimental study.
This paper suggests directions for future research. As suggested by previous accounting
research (Elliott et al. 2007a, Nelson and Rupar 2015) and the hand-collected data referred to
in this paper, the parameters used in sensitivity disclosures are often selected arbitrarily, yet inves-
tors seem to anchor on them as long as the threat presented to their preferred conclusions is not too
high. Therefore, future research might examine mechanisms to reduce this anchoring effect.
As there is considerable variation across companies’ choices of parameters, researchers might
examine factors that managers take into account in choosing the magnitude of hypothetical
changes in sensitivity disclosures. This study examined the judgements of non-professional inves-
tors, and it is possible that professional analysts would react differently to sensitivity disclosures.
They would be less likely to anchor on the parameters presented to them; however, they might be
more sensitive to management’s intentions in choosing a speciﬁc magnitude of hypothetical
change. Therefore, it might be worthwhile for researchers to examine professional investors’ reac-
tions to the magnitude of changes used in sensitivity disclosures.
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Notes
1. There are a few exceptions to this rule, such as SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR 48),
which requires the magnitude of a hypothetical change used in a sensitivity disclosure to be at least
10% if there is no justiﬁcation for using a lower percentage.
2. This assumes a linear or approximately linear relationship between the input and the output. Although
such a linear relationship may not always exist, examination of corporate disclosures reveals ample
examples. For example, see different scenarios in United Inc.’s 2013 10K for sensitivity analysis of
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oil prices and fuel costs, Amazon’s 2013 10K for sensitivity analyses of foreign exchange rates and fair
value of foreign funds, and Capital One’s 2013 10K for sensitivity analyses of interest rates and interest
income. Nevertheless, neurobiological research suggests that humans code distances between numbers
on a logarithmic rather than a linear scale (Dehaene 2003).
3. Elliott et al. (2007a) deﬁne tasks with high integrative complexity as those requiring participants to
draw relatively complex connections between different pieces of ﬁnancial statements and the notes
therein. In their study, the task with high integrative complexity required participants not only to cal-
culate several ratios for two companies, but also to adjust one ﬁrm’s income statement to reﬂect the
information in a footnote. My study did not require any such complex calculations; my participants
were merely expected to use the information on possible price movements in their judgments relating
to these price movements.
4. The participants were told that they owned these shares; they did not pick the shares themselves.
5. The pre-manipulation question was asked in order to control for heterogeneity in participants’ beliefs.
6. I introduced this big difference in payments to create motivated reasoning in a laboratory environment.
If the difference had been smaller, I may not have been able to manipulate motivated reasoning across
participants in this setting, which was crucial to test my ﬁrst hypothesis. Indeed, several accounting
scholars posit that mundane realism, or the extent to which laboratory events are similar to real-
world events (Swieringa and Weick 1982), may undermine manipulations of theoretically important
factors, such as motivated reasoning in my experiment. See Swieringa and Weick (1982), Peecher
and Solomon (2001) and Elliott (2015) for a discussion of mundane realism in accounting experiments.
7. Holding the natural gas price change risk constant.
8. The results show that 60% of participants in this low-threat condition kept at least half of their shares,
suggesting that even participants in the low-threat condition tended to keep their shares, as expected.
9. Participants’ pre-manipulation risk judgments did not have a signiﬁcant effect on the number of shares
they kept; therefore, this is not presented in the analysis.
10. The magnitude of sensitivity disclosures did not have a signiﬁcant effect on investors’ judgments about
the number of shares they wanted to keep. As explained in the methodology section, this was by
design; I wanted to create a setting in which sensitivity disclosures posed some threat to investors.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that participants did not use the information depicted in the disclosures
in their buy/sell decisions. I wanted to create this setting to test my prediction that anchoring, and there-
after spill-over of the anchoring, exist even when investors have an incentive to ignore the sensitivity
disclosures, as long as the incentive is not very high.
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Appendix 1. Examples of different parameters from the sensitivity disclosures of Fortune
100 companies in 2014 10-Ks
Input Parameter Company Output
Oil prices $1 per barrel Exxon Income
10% Plains GP Holdings Fair value of commodity
derivatives
Discount
rate
0.25% Chevron, Valero Energy,
Twentieth Century Fox
Pension liability, Pension
Expense, Expected Return
on Pension Plan Assets
1% McKesson, Walt Disney,
Kroger, Safeway
Pension liability, Pension
expense
0.5% Verizon Pension liability, Pension
expense
(Continued)
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Continued.
Input Parameter Company Output
25 basis points Boeing, United Technologies,
United Parcel Service,
Honeywell
Pension liability, Pension
expense
50 basis points Coca Cola, Fed Ex, Mondelez
International
Pension liability, Pension
expense
10%, 20% Goldman Sachs (*), Citi Group
(*)
Fair value of retained interest
(*), fair value of mortgage
instruments(*)
100 basis points Sears, Super Valu Goodwill
Interest rate 100 basis points Apple, Fannie Mae(*), Freddie
Mac(*), WellPoint (Anthem)
Cigna, Oracle
Fair value of ﬁnancial
instruments(*), income from
ﬁnancial instruments(*),
interest expense
50 basis points, 25 basis
points
Fannie Mae(*), Freddie Mac(*) Fair value of ﬁnancial
instruments(*), income from
ﬁnancial instruments(*)
1% Excess Scripts, Humana, World
Fuel Services
Fair value of ﬁnancial
instruments, interest expense
10% IBM, Met Life, Lock Heed
Martin, John Deere
Fair value of ﬁnancial
instruments, fair value of
debt
10 basis points AmeriSource Bergen Interest expense
15% Humana Fair value of debt
USD/
Foreign
currency
10% (For different
currencies including
Euro, British Pound,
Yuan, Yen, Bolivar)
Hewlett Packard, Costco,
Comcast, Sysco, Merck,
United Continental Holdings,
Direct TV Group, Du Pont
Foreign exchange fair value
loss, fair value of contracts,
income, sales, fair value of
hedges, foreign currency
translation adjustments
20% (For different
currencies including
Euro, Yen, Yuan, Shekel,
Australian Dollar, British
Pound)
Intel, Google Income
(*) Sensitivity disclosure has been disclosed by giving more than one parameter such as depicting the scen-
ario under one hypothetical change and depicting another scenario under another hypothetical change.
Other inputs in the data set include market rate of debt, casualty losses, health care cost trend, estimated
take rate for recall campaigns, returned vehicles, uncollectibles, completion factor for insurance, housing
prices, internal risk ratings for commercial loans, commodity prices, constant prepayment rate, repurchase
rate, cash ﬂows for stores, inventory valuation allowance, average claim cost, equity market prices, estimates
of proved reserves, anticipated credit losses, return on assets, selling prices for excess properties, products
considered obsolete, store closing lease liability, self-insurance liability, fair value of each reporting unit,
price movement in natural gas, price change of securities, stock based compensation expense, variable
rate debt, future mortality rates, expected frequency trend for professional liability claims, fuel prices,
credit spread level, foreign currency contracts, losses in credit card member loans, and S&P 500 with
many different outputs and parameters.
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